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Asymmetric information between food manufacturers and retailers constrains the efforts of analysts studying the retail
food chain. The problem  may be especially pronounced during new product introductions.  Manufacturers  may have
demand information about new products but have incentives to not credibly relay that information. Retailers often lack
reliable demand information  about new products. Understanding the roots of non-credible information flows within the
manufacturer/retailer relationship is important to behavioral modeling in the food chain. This paper provides an analytic
derivation to explain sufficient  conditions for non-credible  information flows leading to asymmetric information and
adverse  selection problems.  Results provide insight about formation of information  sharing mechanisms  in the retail
grocery channel.
Accuracy of retailers'  subjective beliefs about new
product demand  are critical for optimal  decision-
making in the retail food chain.  A retailer's stock-
ing decision is based largely upon demand expec-
tations.  When  economists  or  marketing  analysts
study relationships  in the retail food chain, model-
ing the existence of asymmetric information is im-
portant because,  as  Connor and  Ward  (1980)  ar-
gue,  complete information is a key  input for effi-
ciently functioning markets. Food-marketing litera-
ture  generally  assumes  that  the retailer/manufac-
turer relationship  does not satisfy the complete in-
formation  assumption  (Chu  1992;  Lariviere  and
Padmanabhan  1997;  Kelly  1991;  Patterson  and
Richards  2000). As stated by Chu (1992), "In this
uncertain marketplace,  how do desperate manufac-
turers 'credibly'  inform harried retailers about an-
ticipated demand for new products? Talk is cheap."
Manufacturers  often have information about a new
product and its expected demand, but they may not
be willing to credibly relay that information  to re-
tailers. Retailers may therefore lack reliable demand
estimates  when  determining  which  new products
to shelve  and  the retail  prices  of those products.
Optimal discrimination  among  goods by retailers
is  not possible  without  sufficient,  credible  infor-
mation.
Retailers  make buying/stocking  decisions un-
der  asymmetric  information  about consumer  de-
mand for new products. Information from test mar-
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keting, market analysis and research, and develop-
ment of new products  is controlled by the manu-
facturer.  Retailers  generally  have  a much-dimin-
ished incentive to undergo rigorous test marketing,
market analysis and research,  and development  on
every new product brought to them  by manufac-
turers. Conducting market analysis and research for
each new product presented to them would be cost-
and time-prohibitive,  especially if thousands of new
products are presented to retailers  annually. Alter-
natively,  manufacturers  conduct  market research
only on their own new product or product line. As
a  result,  retailers  and manufacturers  do  not have
the same information about the potential profitabil-
ity of new products. Retailers must find more effi-
cient ways  to  extract  credible  information  from
manufacturers  before making buying/stocking de-
cisions.
One result  of this  asymmetry  of information
may be adverse  selection. Salanie (1997) explains
that adverse selection occurs where the uninformed
party, called the principal  (the retailer, in this case),
is imperfectly  informed or does not know certain
characteristics  of the  informed  party,  called  the
agent (the manufacturer, in this case). Kreps (1990)
argues that adverse selection occurs when one party
to  a transaction has  information  pertaining to the
transaction that is relevant to but unknown by the
second party. Hence the manufacturer having more
information  about the probability distribution of a
new product's demand confronts  the retailer with
adverse selection problems when stocking decisions
are made. Although final consumer demand is not
known with certainty by either party, test market-
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information  controlled  by the  manufacturer  will
likely increase the reliability of the subjective prob-
ability distribution estimated by the manufacturer.
Obtaining credible information about new prod-
ucts is difficult  for  retailers.  Food manufacturers
and retailers  may have  misaligned  or  competing
incentives surrounding new products.  Food manu-
facturers  strive to sell their new products to retail-
ers, thereby gaining shelf access to consumers and
transferring risk of possible low consumer demand
(low sales) to retailers. Information used by manu-
facturers  in sales presentations works to get prod-
ucts on retail shelves and into the consumer's bas-
ket of goods. This information may be persuasively
presented  by  manufacturers  to  get products  on
shelves,  which  may not  align  with  the retailer's
profit  objective.  Retailers  want credible  demand
information on which to base sales  estimates  and
pricing.  Realizing  that they are  assuming the risk
of possible low consumer demand from the manu-
facturers,  retailers  may use  mechanisms  such  as
trade allowances  (i.e.,  slotting allowances and fail-
ure fees) to extract credible information  for stock-
ing and pricing decisions. Chu (1992)  questions the
credibility of information given to retailers by say-
ing:
"... it is possiblefor manufacturers  to re-
port only positive test-market studies (i.e.,
withhold damaging information and
present only favorable information); . . .
product  pitches are always favorable, yet
retailers  report high  failure rates  for new
products... "(Chu  1992, 329).
When manufacturers (agents) are trying to sell
their products,  retailers (principals) should expect
some misinformation  or relay of non-credible  in-
formation.  Manufacturers  are competing  for shelf
space  or an  entry into  the consumer's  purchase-
decision set. By convincing a retailer to shelve  its
new product  the manufacturer  has  entered  the
consumer's  decision  set and  possibly removed  a
competitor's product from that same purchase-de-
cision  set or basket  of goods.  The  manufacturer
thereby  has  an incentive  to relay  persuasive  and
possibly  non-credible  information  to the  retailer.
Hence,  retailers  are  faced  with adverse  selection
problems  when  choosing  new  products  to  stock
shelves.  Properly constructed  incentives  to  pass
credible  information could ameliorate adverse  se-
lection problems.  The  food-retailer  problem  is
analogous to the used-car market as explained  by
Akerlof(1 970). When used-car buyers receive cred-
ible  information  they are  able  to  screen  lemons
(low-quality cars) from peaches (high-quality cars).
Likewise, an incentive  structure (possibly includ-
ing a menu of trade  allowances  or other contract-
based  incentives)  may  reduce  adverse  selection
problems  surrounding  new-product  selection  for
food retailers. Retailers may be able to screen high-
expected-demand products from low-expected-de-
mand products when credible information is passed
from manufacturers  to retailers.
Past studies  (e.g.,  Chu  1992;  Lariviere  and
Padmanabhan  1997) assume that information flows
from manufacturer to retailer may be non-credible.
As explained above, manufacturers may have com-
peting  incentives  to  misrepresent  the  demand  of
new products and transfer demand risk to retailers.
However,, behavioral  models  of manufacturer/re-
tailer interactions have not yet been developed to
analytically  derive  sufficient  conditions  under
which  information  flows  can be  viewed  as  non-
credible.  In this  paper,  sufficient  conditions  are
derived to support the assumption of non-credible
information  flows  between a single manufacturer
and a single retailer.  These  conditions show how
non-credible information may be used to influence
retail-pricing  decisions  and therefore  impact  de-
mand for a new product. Implications of non-cred-
ible information flows lead to application of mecha-
nism- (or contract-)  design models  for alleviating
asymmetric information  problems.
Analytic Model  and Results
Why would a food product manufacturer not share
private information?  Anecdotal  reasons  (with the
objective of gaining retail-shelf access while trans-
ferring demand  risk) have been given why  infor-
mation presented by manufacturers  in sales pitches
may not be  credible  (Chu  1992;  Lariviere  and
Padmanathan  1997).  Misaligned  incentives  be-
tween principals  and agents may be influencing  a
manufacturer's actions. The model below is a sim-
plified  behavioral  representation  of the principal-
agent relationship  between  a single  manufacturer
and a single retailer in the food sector. The follow-
ing notation is used throughout the model:
32  November 2003Non-Credible Information Flows Between Food Manufacturers  and Retailers  33
Q  =  uncertain quantity of product i demanded
Pi =  retail price of product i
0i =  uncertain intercept of the demand  curve
for i
mi =  uncertain slope of the demand curve for i
R =  information  set available to the retailer
M =  information set available to the manufac-
turer
iT  =  retailer profit from product i
W = wholesale price of product i
E =expectations  operator
C =  manufacturer's  per-unit marginal cost of
product i
i.  =  manufacturer profit  from product i.
I assume a linear product demand curve
(1)  Qi = 0i-  P
and  no cross-product  effects.  This  assumption,
which assumes no substitutes or complements for
the new product, eases notation and analytical bur-
den but does not affect the qualitative conclusions
drawn. As the demand parameters  0, and rT  are not
observed  prior  to product  introduction,  they  are
treated as random variables and are assumed to be
independently  distributed.  Admittedly, brand loy-
alty, advertising, and other marketing concepts may
affect the slope and intercept of the demand curve,
but the values of those parameters  are not known
with certainty prior to product introduction.  (In fact,
after product introduction  only observations  from
the  demand  distribution  are  realized.)  The  equa-
tion
(2)  i  = (Pi-  W)Qi
= (Pi-  W)(0i - BIP/)
defines uncertain  retailer profit from product i. Let
R  be the information  set available  to the retailer.
Expected retailer profit is conditioned  on R:
(3)  E[i] = (Pi  - W)(E[OIR] - E[rqilR]P).
The  retailer chooses  retail  price P, to  maximize
expected profit as
(4)  Max E[7,] = (P  - W)(E[0,IR] - E[r,IR]P.).
problem is
(5)  E[R]  =  E[[R]-E[rilR]P)- (P-  W)E[r[R] = O.
Solving for the optimal retail price P.*  yields
(6)  P*  E[0,R] +  E[iRI,](W)
(6  i  2E[riIR]
The  second-order  condition  requires  concav-
ity of the direct-profit function in the neighborhood
of P*. This condition is necessary to assure expected
profit is at a maximum. The third condition, namely
the total condition,  requires  profits  be positive  at
P.* (Beattie and  Taylor  1985;  Silberberg  1990).  If
returns  at  Pi* do  not exceed  variable  cost, profits
are not  possible  in  the  short run.  Assuming  that
these two conditions hold, equation (6) defines "op-
timal" retail price  given retailer's imperfect infor-
mation.
In a simplified model representing  a one manu-
facturer-one  retailer relationship,  retail sales  (i.e.,
quantity demanded) of the product are  determined
by the price  chosen  by the retailer.  Furthermore,
manufacturer  profit-which is also uncertain-is
a function of retail price:
(7)  iPi*  = (W - C.)(0i - ,lPi*)
and expected manufacturer profit is given as
(8)  E[W,IP,*] = (W,-  C.)(E[0,lM3  - E[nilM,(P,*)
where M is  the  information  set available  to  the
manufacturer.  Substituting  the "optimal" retail
price found in equation (6) gives
E[V,[P,*] (9)  JR] +  E[II,[R](147)
(W - Ci)([0iAMI  +  . E[[]  ). I  - L1m)m][  2E[nLW]'
Taking  the partial derivatives  with respect to the
intercept and slope of the demand curve of product
i conditioned on retailer expectations  gives us
(10)  aO  = (W-C)(-  2E[  <0.R]
The  first-order  condition  for this  maximization
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(1  1)  a(.)  - (W  CE[  - E[OJ-R]  >0. (11)  OEg]  - (W  r-IaIMR  2(E[rT1[R]2)
Discussion
Understanding the economic  implications of equa-
tions (10) and (11)  requires  an analysis  from both
retailer and manufacturer perspectives.  The partial
derivative  of manufacturer  profit from  product  i
with respect to the intercept parameter is less than
zero,  shown by equation (10). The equation is less
than zero because the first term (W.-C)  is assumed
to be positive (because manufacturers typically do
not sell products for less than the marginal cost of
producing the products) and the expectation terms
will be negative because the demand curve for nor-
mal goods is downward sloping. Consequently, re-
tailer expectations of  higher intercepts lead to higher
estimated  "optimal"  retail  prices.  Higher  retail
prices  induce  less quantity  demanded  for normal
goods.  For the  manufacturer,  less  quantity  de-
manded decreases quantity demanded of his prod-
uct and profit from product sales. Expected manu-
facturer  profit therefore  decreases  as  retailer  ex-
pectations  about  the demand-intercept  parameter
increase.  This  assumes  constant  wholesale price
(i.e.,  no  portion of increased retail  price  will be
passed on to the manufacturer  or, alternatively,  no
"volume discount" on wholesale price will be given
to retailer for increased volume of product  sales).
The  partial  derivative  of manufacturer  profit
from product i with respect to the slope parameter
is greater than zero,  shown by equation (11). This
equation is greater than zero based on assumptions
(as discussed for equation (10)) that manufacturers
receive returns above marginal production costs and
that the expectation  terms are negative for normal
goods. When a retailer believes price sensitivity is
higher for a product, a lower "optimal" retail price
is chosen by the retailer to achieve greater quantity
demanded.  The manufacturer's  expected profit  is
determined in part by the quantity of sales or quan-
tity of units demanded multiplied by manufacturer
margin  per unit.  If a lower retail price per unit  is
chosen by the retailer,  higher quantity demanded
occurs  and manufacturer  expected profit  benefits
from larger quantity of sales. Therefore,  manufac-
turer expected profit increases  as retailer expecta-
tions  about price  sensitivity  of demand  increase.
Once again, this result assumes constant wholesale
price.
As explained, equations (10) and (11) show that
the manufacturer  has incentives to misinform  the
retailer about demand parameters.  Retailer subjec-
tive  expectations  about new-product  demand  (or
information  available to the retailer about product
demand) are used when the retailer maximizes ex-
pected profit and determines "optimal" retail price.
"Optimal"  retail price  (which  is a function of re-
tailer beliefs)  is used to calculate  expected  profit
of the manufacturer.  Hence, manufacturer expected
profit  is directly  affected by retailer  choices  and
provides incentive  for manufacturers  to influence
retailer decisions.
Implications  and Applications
As the economic discussion implies, because equa-
tions (10) and (11) are not equal to zero, expected
manufacturer  profit  depends  upon  the  retailer's
beliefs about the  slope  and intercept-demand  pa-
rameters as transmitted through the retailer's esti-
mate  of "optimal"  price.  Manufacturer  expected
profit will  increase  or decrease  based  upon  the
retailer's beliefs about demand slope and intercept
parameters given the model assumptions. If a manu-
facturer  can  influence  the retailer's  beliefs  about
the size or direction of the demand parameters,  he
will be influencing "optimal"  retail price and ulti-
mately his expected profit. Given the incentive to
increase  expected profit,  a manufacturer  can be
expected to  influence  retailer's  beliefs,  possibly
through persuasive  marketing tactics.  In practice,
a manufacturer's sales representative can try to in-
fluence  a  retailer's  beliefs  about demand param-
eters  through  sales  presentations.  Pertinent  test-
market results and market analysis can be relayed,
or not relayed, to influence those beliefs. While the
marketing function incurs costs, the cost to present
sales information in a manner benefitting the manu-
facturer is assumed to not add additional expense
to the  routine  sales  presentation.  In other words,
no added transactions costs are incurred by a sales
representative  choosing  to  present only  positive
test-market or focus-group results.
Manufacturers  will try to influence retailer be-
liefs about  demand  parameters,  but,  admittedly,
there  may be  a point  at which  such  tactics prove
counterproductive.  For example,  a manufacturer
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may want a retailer to believe her product is price
sensitive  so that  a  lower  "optimal"  retail price  is
chosen.  In theory,  with  a  lower retail price more
quantity  is  demanded  of normal  goods,  hence
greater product sales occur. But a possible scenario
may occur where the retailer determines a product
is too price sensitive.  While there is no published
"benchmark"  level  of price  sensitivity,  a retailer
may question the feasibility of shelving such a prod-
uct when a minimal increase in price may severely
decrease quantity demanded. Without mechanisms
to reliably transmit credible information, manufac-
turers must determine appropriate levels of persua-
siveness, while retailers must try to extract truthful
information.
Manufacturers  may exhibit  strategic behavior
to ensure  a  product  is  shelved,  but  one  must re-
member that  in practice  retailers  are the  primary
gate-keepers  to consumers (excluding  direct-mar-
keting,  Internet,  and  other  outlets).  Retailers  un-
derstand  the  risk (of possible  low  consumer  de-
mand) they are assuming when shelving new prod-
ucts. In practice, retailers use trade allowances such
as  ex-ante slotting  allowances  and ex-post failure
fees as mechanisms for transferring or sharing some
of this  risk with manufacturers.  Theoretically,  as
shown  by  Chu  (1992)  and  Lariviere  and
Padmanabhan (1997), slotting allowances  for new
products may be a direct result of information asym-
metry  leading  to  adverse  selection.  This body  of
literature alleviates  adverse selection problems by
screening  or  sorting  through  mechanism-design
modeling. Essentially,  a product will be shelved if
it is expected to return positive profit (or a reserva-
tion profit level) after paying a slotting allowance.
When  the manufacturer  chooses  to pay a slotting
allowance  to  shelve  a  new  product,  the
manufacturer's  privately held information (namely,
the  product's  subjective  probability  distribution
estimated  by the manufacturer)  is revealed.
Undoubtedly,  retailers  have  rational  expecta-
tions  about a  manufacturer's  claims.  In practice,
retailers  may discount claims to  some extent.  But
the fact remains that new-product  failure rates re-
main high. Patterson and Richards (2000) state that
the percentage  of new  products  that do not meet
sales targets within six months is over 95 percent.
If current retailers are precisely discounting claims,
the new-product failure rate should not be so high.
One plausible  explanation  is that  retailers do not
fully discount manufacturers'  new-product claims
during sales presentations due to adverse selection
problems  and the  relay of non-credible  informal
tion. The results given here suggest that behavioral
modeling of the manufacturer-retailer  relationship
should  include  asymmetric  information,  possibly
through game-theoretic or mechanism-design mod,
eling.  Mechanism-design  modeling  allows manu,
facturer  choice of incentive-compatible  contracts,
whereby manufacturer information is revealed and
a retailer does not need to "guess"  an appropriate
way to discount marketing claims.
One goal of various trade allowances-slotting
allowances,  for example-is  to enhance the relay
of information  between manufacturers  and retail-
ers. Slotting allowances are used frequently during
the shelving of new products in the grocery indus-
try (Weir 1999; Partch 1999; Bloom, Gundlach, and
Cannon  2000).  As explained by one international
grocery retail executive, retailers may request slot-
ting allowances because of the risk associated with
shelving new products about which retailers have
limited  information  (Sussman  2000).  In practice
these allowances may be a form of insurance against
product failure or a way of recouping probable costs
of low-demand products.  This industry behavior is
consistent with finding ways to compensate for in-
formation asymmetry between manufacturers  and
retailers.
The impetus behind slotting allowances in the
grocery industry parallels  a lender's quest to learn
more  about new  borrowers  in finance  and  credit
industries.  In practice,  loan contracts are designed
to extract more information about prospective bor-
rowers and thus to manage adverse selection prob-
lems  for banks  and  other  lenders.  By choosing
among a menu of contract terms, borrowers reveal
their true risk (of loan default) positions by choos-
ing an  incentive-compatible  price  and non-price
contract  (Bester 1985). Price and non-price terms
in banking may include,  for example, different in-
terest rates,  points,  downpayment  amounts,  and
collateral  combinations.  Similarly,  the  insurance
industry uses a menu of contract terms, chosen by
the insured,  to  reveal  a  true risk position.  In the
grocery industry, such mechanisms for information
revelation may include slotting allowances, failure
fees,  and other contract terms.
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Conclusions
This paper introduces  a stylized profit-maximiza-
tion model, given certain assumptions, that explores
information asymmetry and adverse selection in the
retail food  chain. This result builds upon past be-
havioral  or  anecdotal  comments  by  analytically
showing economic justification for a manufacturer
to  try to  increase her own  expected profit  by at-
tempting  to  influence  retailers'  beliefs  about  de-
mand parameters. In practice, a manufacturer is be-
having  rationally  by persuading  retailers,  some-
times with non-credible  claims. As shown, objec-
tives  are  not always  perfectly  aligned  between
manufacturers  and retailers, so incentives exist for
manufacturers  to  relay non-credible  information.
Hence  it is also rational for retailers to seek alter-
native means, sometimes through an array of trade
allowances,  to induce the credible  relay of infor-
mation  by manufacturers.  Models  assuming  per-
fect and  symmetric information between  a manu-
facturer and a retailer do not incorporate the com-
plexities of non-credible information flows. Game-
theoretic  or mechanism-design  modeling may of-
fer food-industry researchers  opportunities  for in-
corporating information asymmetry into behavioral
modeling of the retail food channel.
While this study models  a single profit-maxi-
mizing manufacturer selling to a single profit-maxi-
mizing  retailer,  the  simplified model  provides  a
catalyst  for explaining  non-credible  information
flows as they extend from asymmetric information
and adverse selection  in the grocery industry.  Ad-
mittedly,  this model  abstracts  from  reality by fo-
cusing on a single relationship,  or one-product in-
teraction between  manufacturer and  retailer. Fur-
ther studies may model multiple product introduc-
tions  or "repeated  games"  to  assist retailers  in
weighing the credibility of a manufacturer's claims.
Also, further analysis could generalize the analytic
results  to multiple  manufacturers  selling  to mul-
tiple retailers.
Applying methodologies from other disciplines
and industries can strengthen modeling of the food
industry.  Opportunities  for studying  asymmetric
information,  adverse  selection  and non-credible
information  flows in the retail food channel paral-
lel similar work in other industries.  Food-industry
analysts  and researchers  can  look  to  mechanism
design applications in insurance and credit as a cata-
lyst for further research. In practice the food indus-
try  can  implement  asymmetric  information  into
decision-making  about introducing,  shelving,  and
pricing new products. Understanding the elements
of adverse selection and non-credible  information
flows provides an impetus for food-industry manu-
facturers and retailers to construct menus of trade-
allowance terms.  When a manufacturer  chooses a
contract package with  specific  slotting allowance
and  other  contract terms,  credible  information  is
revealed by the manufacturer.  While slotting-allow-
ance literature has begun to explain these theoreti-
cal and  modeling  advances,  more  opportunities
exist for industry application.
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